![]() ![]() ![]() In this market, the badge counts for much more than mechanical excellence, or speeds and feeds, and value for money is low on the list. The VW badge on a car that looked like a stretched Passat just didn’t have the cachet buyers in the luxury car segment treasured. In a 2004 Motor Tend comparison test, the Phaeton came ahead of the Jaguar Vanden Plas, the Mercedes S430 and the BMW 745i, but behind the Lexus LS 430 and the Audi A8L.ĭespite the rave reviews, buyers stayed away in droves. Without question it is a magnificent vehicle.’ It is overwhelmingly the best value among high-end luxury cars. Power’s right.’ Business 2.0 said the Phaeton ‘might be the most compelling luxury vehicle currently sold. And the cars were impressive, collecting rave reviews even from the hard-nosed US media.įorbes called the Phaeton a ‘great car.’ USA Today wrote: ‘The interior decor sets a standard for class and taste. Seeing is BelievingĪ better idea was the purpose-built factory with glass walls, which let customers see VW craftsmen put the finishing touches on their cars before they picked them up. The obvious question here is: what made the marketers think they could establish VW as a player in the luxury car market with a tragic name, a glass factory and a bit of clever advertising? The most likely answer is that no one at VW had the guts to tell Chairman Piëch that it was a dumb idea. The Touareg had nothing in common with the Phaeton - it shared parts with Porsches and Audis, and was clearly aimed at a different market segment. The Touareg, VW’s new high-end SUV, was part of the campaign - a bad mistake when you’re launching a brand new car into a brand new market. Classy advertising was placed in luxury lifestyle publications and on luxury-focused websites. ![]() The mail-out contained a hardback book in a matte-black sleeve to reflect the luxury theme. VW’s marketers decided to avoid broad-shot TV advertising and instead focused its campaign on direct marketing, telemarketing and personalized mail shots to thousands of luxury car buyers. In the end Zeus stopped Phaeton with a thunderbolt, which was the end of him. As a result, the chariot scorched the earth and all the crops, and the heat killed all the animals as well. When he let his offspring drive his chariot across the sky one day, Phaeton couldn’t control the horses so they strayed off course. Phaeton was the son of Helios, the Sun God. The marketing brains at VW fell into line, of course, perhaps without first checking their Greek mythology. The weekly magazine Der Spiegel once described the work environment at VW as ‘North Korea without the labour camps’. Dumb Names Kill CarsĪ furious chairman does not make a great basis for a winning marketing strategy, but Piëch was a man used to getting his way. The downside was a weight of 2.5 tons, which dulled its performance and made it very thirsty. The Phaeton offered an advanced W12 engine, 4-wheel drive, aluminum body panels, double-paned glass, computer navigation, adaptive air suspension, radar adaptive cruise control, heated and cooled seats, and a cabin that oozed serious luxury. Among the parameters he laid down was the ability to travel at 300km/h all day long in 50☌ heat while keeping the interior temperature at a constant 22☌. Piëch’s design brief for the Phaeton was for a car that could not only compete with Mercedes‘ S-class, but beat it at its own game. Piëch was the grandson of Ferdinand Porsche, and a colossus of the German car industry who made Porsche a major force in motor racing in the 1970s, turned Audi into a competitor to Mercedes and BMW in the 80s, and led VW into a bright new post-Beetle future. The story goes that this move enraged VW chairman Ferdinand Piëch so much that he decided to retaliate by building a VW that would take on Mercedes on its luxury turf. Mercedes used the 1997 Frankfurt Auto Show to unveil its new A-Class, which was clearly aimed at VW’s traditional market. Getting Even makes for a Bad Marketing Strategy ![]()
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